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The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined?

BENJAMIN MILLER

In the aftermath of the Cold War there have been many calls for adopting a new conception of security and for extending the traditional concept. Thus, the United Nations Development Program advocated in 1994 a transition 'from nuclear security to human security', or to 'the basic concept of human security', defined as safety from 'such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression', and 'protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions'. The International Commission on Global Governance recommended in 1995 that 'Global security must be broadened from its traditional focus on the security of states to the security of people and the planet.' Clinton administration officials repeatedly referred to extended or 'human' security, including to 'a new understanding of the meaning and nature of national security and of the role of individuals and nation-states'.¹

Among scholars Richard Ullman² was one of the first to advocate an extension of the security concept to include a wide range of threats from natural disasters and diseases to environmental degradation.³ Such advocacy became much more prominent with the end of the US-Soviet rivalry because of a decline in military threats while other threats, notably to the environment and thus to human well-being, have seemed to increase in recent decades.⁴

In contrast, the traditionalist approach to security persists in defining the field of security studies exclusively in terms of 'the study of the threat, use, and control of military force'.⁵ Similarly, Helga Haftendorn equates security with 'the absence of a military threat or with the protection of the nation from external overthrow or attack'.⁶

Are the new conceptions and extensions necessary or is the traditional concept the right way to address the security issue? Are the re-definitions

useful or do they carry heavy costs which will bring more damage than benefit to our understanding of the security concept?

In this study I address the debate on the expansion of the concept of security which emerged especially after the end of the Cold War. I will argue that the 'expanders' of the concept beyond the focus on threats of organized violence and armed conflicts are wrong because of the resultant loss of intellectual coherence of the concept and of the security field, and also because of the remaining importance of the question of war and violence under international anarchy. But on the other hand, the 'minimalists' (who are mostly realists and can also be called traditionalists), while avoiding these two potential problems of the expanders, are also wrong by de-emphasizing both peace as a central component of the security field and nonmilitary causes or means affecting national as well as regional and international security.

My argument is based on a distinction between the phenomenon to be explained (or dependent variable), which defines the scope of a field and the substantive issues it addresses, and the explanations (or independent variables), which include all the relevant competing causal factors affecting the explained phenomenon. The subject matter that the security field addresses is the threat of organized inter-group violence (including interstate and low-intensity conflict) and the ways to manage and to prevent it. Here a somewhat broadened version of the traditionalist security concept is in order which should treat peace as a central element of the field alongside war; in fact, as the other side of the security coin.

Yet, regarding the competing explanations of war and peace, the door should be kept wide open to a great variety of causal factors, theories and explanations, on the condition that they logically and empirically affect war and peace. Thus, environmental degradation should be part of the security field only to the extent that environmental factors affect the likelihood of armed conflict, namely, war and peace. But environmental threats which are unrelated to these issues should be excluded from the security field despite their great importance for the welfare of the human species. They obviously deserve to be addressed in a very prominent way, both academically and policy-wise, but in other contexts.

I will start with a brief discussion of the relations between international anarchy and national and international security. After presenting the traditional approach to the concept of security in international relations, the essay will introduce the major challenges which have emerged to the traditional conception, and which have grown immensely since the end of the Cold War.

I will then discuss the limitations to these challenges and suggest an approach that will help maintain conceptual coherence through a focus on the substantive issues of war and peace. I will illustrate the discussion with aspects of the national security of Israel. The main implication of the proposed approach for Israel is that its national security debate should continue to focus on threats of organized violence (by states and non-state guerrilla and terrorist organizations) to national core values, but the complex relations between peace and such threats should be a major focus of inquiry in both the academic and policy communities.

ANARCHY AND SECURITY

Due to the many threats that states have traditionally faced to their values and independence in the anarchic international system, the concept of security has long been a key concept in international relations. International anarchy means neither a war of all against all, nor a total disorder and a lack of cooperation, nor an absence of norms and rules in the international system. Rather, it means that in the absence of a global law-enforcement agency and effective global institutions to manage international conflicts, there is no automatic security provider to all states. This stands in contrast to the situation within normal states, which are sovereign, namely, constitute the ultimate and exclusive governing authority within a defined territory. Thus, states have central institutions which are in charge of keeping law and order within that territory and have a monopoly over means of violence there.⁷

Precisely because states are sovereign, there is no higher overall authority in the international system. As a result, the system is one of self-help, namely, the states must take care of their own national security.⁸

To illustrate the difference, within an ideal functioning state every citizen can dial a certain number such as '911' in order to call the police if he or she is attacked, and the police is obligated to help irrespective of the citizen's identity, income or ethnic affiliation. Thus, to the extent that there are specialized agencies which provide security to all, citizens do not have to arm themselves in order to defend their families. By not arming themselves they also do not pose threats to their neighbors and the likelihood of an arms race among citizens is low. In contrast, in the international system there is still no functionally equivalent effective agency which would respond automatically and universally to calls for help by any state that has been attacked, irrespective of its particular attributes (e.g., its resource endowment, geographical location, strategic importance, or alignments).

Anarchy, that is, the absence of a supreme reliable law-enforcement agency, may encourage wars among states in three major ways.

First, it may permit powerful aggressive or revisionist states to initiate wars, as under anarchy there is no powerful central authority to stop them. In this sense, although anarchy serves as a permissive factor,⁹ the causes of specific wars lie in the aggressive intentions and attributes of the initiating state.

Second, in light of the weakness of the international institutions for conflict resolution and the absence of effective agency to enforce settlements, a resort to force remains a final arbiter of inter-state conflicts, even when the parties are not necessarily aggressive. As Waltz argues: 'in politics force is said to be the ultima ratio. In international politics force serves not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one.'¹⁰ Thus, the first road to war results from the absence of an international police force to deter aggressors, while the second stems from the lack of an effective international judicial system.

Third, anarchy may have a more direct effect on the outbreak of wars through the operation of the security dilemma. The security dilemma refers to a vicious interaction whereby measures that a state adopts to increase its own security constitute a threat to others who, as a result, take defensive steps of their own, which in turn reduce the sense of security of the first state.¹¹ In a self-help system, the quest of states to survive and the resultant security dilemma are sufficient to lead even status quo powers to pursue arms races, construct alliances, and occasionally even stumble into undesired and unintended wars.¹²

This understanding of international anarchy and its implications has given rise to the traditional concept of security.

THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF SECURITY

The dictionary definition refers to security in the most general sense as freedom from threats, fear and dangers.¹³ Thus, one is secure under two conditions. First, when no one poses a threat to previously acquired values.¹⁴ Second, if such threats exist, one will be secure if one has the capability to defend oneself against the sources of danger at reasonable costs.¹⁵

The traditional conception of national security is composed of five major dimensions:¹⁶

1. *The origin of threats*: threats to national security are posed by other states, notably revisionist states which are dissatisfied with the status quo. Most of

the threats are posed either by proximate neighbors, which have both the opportunity (i.e., the capabilities) and the motivation due to substantive sources of conflict (i.e., territory and borders, ethnicity and nationalism) to pose a threat,¹⁷ or by the great powers which have both global power-projection capabilities and world-wide interests.

2. *The nature of threats*: according to the traditional conception involves mostly offensive military capabilities possessed or acquired by opponents. But since in many cases it is almost impossible to make a clear-cut distinction between offensive and defensive capabilities, any military reinforcement of the opponents (neighbors in the case of regional states, great powers in the case of other great powers) is seen as a potential threat which requires a balancing reaction.¹⁸ In addition to growth in the opponent's offensive capabilities, other moves on its part that are likely to be viewed as threatening are joining an opposing alliance, let alone a mobilization of forces, putting them on high degrees of alert and concentrating them near one's border.

3. *The response*: the only relevant and appropriate response to such military threats according to the traditional approach to security is also viewed as military – the maintenance of a deterrent posture through armament or the movement or alert of forces, or diplomatic-military– the establishment of alliances.

4. *Who is responsible for providing security?* Since there is no reliable supra-national security provider to all states, the state itself is the only body which can take care of its own security in a self-help system.

5. *Core values* for the defense of which the state is ready to go to war in the traditional conception are related to the nation-state – preserving its sovereignty and national independence, maintaining its territorial integrity and the sanctity of its boundaries and not tolerating coercive interference in its domestic affairs.

This traditional conception of security was criticized well before the end of the Cold War.¹⁹ One major point raised by the critics was the appropriateness of exclusively military responses to security threats. Due to the working of the security dilemma²⁰ an accumulation of military power may jeopardize national security rather than enhance it because the opponent may regard it as a threat. In light of the security dilemma, the state should moderate its military buildup in order not to provoke others and at the same time try to reduce the opponents' incentives to use force by

accommodating their key legitimate interests and demands and thus changing their *intentions* and making them more peaceful.

This strategy, if successful, may achieve the first above-mentioned condition of security: the absence of threats, rather than the capability to meet them at reasonable costs. Indeed, according to Wolfers, 'the ideal security policy is one that would lead to a distribution of values so satisfactory to all nations that the intention to attack and with it the problem of security would be minimized'.²¹ Yet, such an aspiration can be utopian in many cases while, on the other hand, too much moderation and concessions may convey weakness to potential aggressors and thus tempt them to be more aggressive – an argument often based on 'the Munich analogy'.²²

This dilemma of resolve or coercion versus accommodation and concessions has not been resolved so far in international relations theory.²³ Yet, the critique of the traditional approach for its exclusive focus on military means implies that the concept of security should be expanded to include diverse non-military strategies for reducing security threats such as conflict resolution and peacemaking, economic development, functional cooperation in various issue-areas, regional integration or democratization. Most important, this critique raises the need for studying under what conditions all these alternative strategies will contribute to security, and under what conditions they will be counterproductive.

THE POST-COLD WAR EXPANSION OF THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF SECURITY

While the older critique of the traditional approach has focused on the issue of military versus non-military responses to security threats, the end of the Cold War has brought about a great variety of demands to expand the concept of security on all five of its dimensions. The background to this new approach is the feeling that a fundamental transformation is taking place in the international arena, and that it is moving away from the traditional world of territorial states,²⁴ military threats and the danger of war²⁵ and inter-state rivalry.²⁶ Instead, completely different challenges and needs have moved to the top of the global and human agenda.²⁷

According to this approach, such a transformation is not only occurring empirically, but is also desirable on normative grounds in order to advance human values and needs. Thus, the traditional approach loses ground not only empirically, due to the dramatic transformation that has allegedly occurred in many arenas of world politics, but also on a normative basis.

The Origin of Threats: From External to Domestic; and from State to Global

The new approach criticizes the traditional conception of security for focusing on external challenges, most notably, military threats posed by rival states. Critics of the traditional conception argue that rather than originating from rival states, the origin of contemporary security threats is either nonstate (domestic or transnational), or, in a different conception, the state itself poses a threat to its citizens. Military conflicts result primarily from problems of domestic legitimacy, such as revolutionary challenges to the legitimacy of elites and political regimes²⁸ or from ethno-national challenges to the legitimacy of states and their boundaries²⁹ on the part of secessionists (such as Tamils, Basques, Chechens) or pan-national unionists (Serbs, pan-Arabists).

This criticism relies on studies, especially those focusing on Third World security, which have shown that most wars in recent years have been domestic rather than inter-state.³⁰ Even though there is frequently external intervention in the domestic upheavals, the major form of intervention is not by armies crossing international borders but rather by guerrilla organizations and militias, insurgents, secessionist and terrorist groups and transnational crime organizations, who find shelter in neighboring states and cross borders back and forth at will.

Moreover, many critics argue that from the point of view of numerous human beings, the major security threat is posed by the states themselves, which violate their human rights, discriminate on ethnic, racial or gender basis, jail dissidents and even carry out ethnic cleansing and mass killings.³¹ On the other hand, failed states (such as Haiti, numerous African states, Afghanistan, and at times some former Yugoslav and Soviet republics, including to an extent even Russia) leave their citizens vulnerable to threats by a variety of gangs, militias, terrorists, criminals and polluters. The armaments of many states, especially in the Third World, are not designed to protect their citizens but only to secure the regime and the elite, and are often used against the population. Furthermore, many threats to humankind now originate not from specific aggressive states, but are global and transnational in nature, such as pollution, hunger, diseases, drugs, and the threat of proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction to both rogue states and transnational terrorist groups.

The Nature of Threats – from Military to Comprehensive: The critics advocate a much more comprehensive approach to security which views it as ‘human security’ addressing a great variety of menaces.³² The

comprehensive notion of security was introduced by Ullman³³ who viewed it as the efforts to meet human needs and protect the residents of the state against events that threaten to degrade their quality of life, such as natural disasters and environmental problems. Buzan similarly advances a comprehensive multi-dimensional view of security divided into five major dimensions: military, political, social, economic and environmental.³⁴

The 'expanders' not only see nonmilitary problems as the source of military conflicts, but also argue that nonmilitary threats are much more relevant to most people than military ones, especially since the end of the Cold War. For many people in the industrialized world the most relevant threats are economic ones (job insecurity and the fear of chronic unemployment, or having to cope with low-paid jobs). There are also identity/cultural threats to established societies and to dominant groups posed by illegal immigration and refugees.³⁵ The problem of illegal drug trafficking by transnational crime gangs is a major problem for the US and many other industrialized states. The narcotics threat is closely related to high crime rates in urban centers posing mortal threats to many individuals in low-income neighborhoods.³⁶

People in the South face grave economic threats to their well-being and even survival due to the shortage of basic necessities such as housing and foodstuff leading occasionally to mass starvation.³⁷ Spreading diseases like AIDS cross national borders and result in high death rates. Because of the acute threats they pose to the survival of very large segments of the human species, meeting such human needs as food, health and housing is a crucial aspect of national security.³⁸

In the last two decades there has also been an enormous increase in the awareness of ecological threats as major issues of security,³⁹ because of environmental degradation and pollution, the depletion of the ozone layer, global warming due to a greenhouse effect, and resource scarcity coupled with population growth.⁴⁰ According to the new approach, all these threats far exceed traditional security threats in importance and relevance.

Changing Responses: from Military to Nonmilitary – A change in the conception of the problem – the diagnosis of the origins and nature of security threats – leads to a change in the prescription. Thus, if the source of the security problem is the nature of the domestic regime, an accumulation of military capabilities by the state would not be a useful solution but rather a part of the problem. Thus, military investments come at the expense of economic growth and spending on human needs such as food and health.⁴¹ In addition, acquired armaments are likely to be used against the population. Instead, a host of nonmilitary/civilian solutions such

as democratization, state-building, the development of civil society and economic growth and interdependence are much more helpful.

Since much of the new approach to security focuses on the domestic arena, domestic transformation is seen as essential to address security problems. In this context, many, including US administrations in the 1990s, prescribe democratization. This is partly because democracies tend to behave less violently to other states, especially if they are also democracies, thus creating a zone of democratic peace,⁴² but also because liberal democracies adhere more to universal human rights, are much more tolerant to minorities and take care of basic human needs rather than maintaining a narrow exploitative elite in power.

Others are worried about the de-stabilizing effects of rapid democratization, especially in weak multi-ethnic states which lack a liberal tradition.⁴³ Thus, in order to control ethnic conflicts and rising attempts at secession, some Third World specialists prefer an initial focus on strengthening existing state institutions and maintaining their monopoly on coercive power as prerequisites to democratization at a later stage.⁴⁴ Strengthening existing states should also help them deal successfully with domestic and trans-border security threats.

While political liberalism focuses on liberal democracy as the key to peace and security, economic liberalism prescribes free and open markets that lead to rising interdependence through growing trade, the globalization of production and investment, and the free movement of people, goods, money and services. In the view of economic liberalism, this will bring about more peaceful relations among states because interdependence increases the stakes in continued trade rather than in territorial expansion, which becomes increasingly obsolete and economically irrelevant in highly developed economies.⁴⁵ Thus, economic prosperity increases the stakes in peace and decreases the motivation for war.

Globalization and interdependence constrain the ability of states to act unilaterally not only in economic matters but also in the security domain. Moreover, according to this perspective, free markets will bring increased prosperity and the fulfillment of human needs and thus will address the new security agenda much better than spending scarce resources on wasteful armies, which protect regimes rather than peoples and bring destruction rather than addressing major human problems and providing for basic necessities of the common people.

Changing Responsibility for Security – from National Security to Common Security: While the traditional conception views the state as the sole agent responsible for its national security in an anarchic self-help

international system, new views underline the interdependence of security relations and thus see security as common to humankind.⁴⁶ Common security means that there are global threats to all of humanity which cannot be addressed by individual nation-states.⁴⁷ This conception leads to a focus on international cooperation rather than competition and to multilateralism rather than unilateralism in managing global security challenges.⁴⁸

This logic suggests a key role for global agencies, most notably the UN or respective regional organizations.⁴⁹ Moreover, in acting for common security, international institutions can limit a traditional core value of states – state sovereignty – by intrusive inspection for the purposes of diminishing states' ability to initiate surprise attacks and enforcing arms control, especially nonproliferation of WMD (such as the inspection regime established in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War which lasted until 1998). The international organizations can also go beyond traditional collective security by exercising the right to carry out 'humanitarian interventions' if universal norms are infringed upon by massive violations of human rights, most notably, ethnic cleansing and genocide.⁵⁰

Apart from pure morality, political instability and ethnic conflict are now treated by other states as posing a threat to their key interests in more ways than before⁵¹ notably by creating mass flows of immigrants and spreading instability. This brings about a growing perception of 'strategic interdependence' among all the actors in the international system.⁵² As a result, domestic as well as local conflicts are seen as major international security issues which have to be addressed by joint actions of the international community.

Core Values: from National to Global; from the State to the Individual

In contrast to the traditional concept of national security, which focused on defending the key core values of national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the challengers of the traditional approach argue that a process of value change is under way and that it is desirable that this process continue and accelerate. The new values, which are supposedly replacing the centrality of the nation-state, are located at both the individual and global levels. On the individual level, the new values are associated with human rights and needs. On the global level, the focus is on transnational values common to all humanity: on the one hand, the spreading of democracy and free markets, and on the other, ensuring the well-being of the human race against common threats through the protection of the environment and fighting transborder pollution, diseases, drugs and crime and the proliferation of non-conventional weapons.

At the same time, the former core value of state sovereignty is in decline both as a result of the emerging new values and of rising transborder technological and socio-economic forces, which undermine state power and government control and make states much more penetrable in key areas (the information revolution reaching its climax with the Internet, instant massive financial transactions, mounting volumes of commerce in goods and services, and the spread of ideas across boundaries).

Thus, the ‘expanders’ present a comprehensive view of common security which poses serious challenges to the traditional-minimalist conception on all its dimensions (see Figure 1).

LIMITATIONS AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE EXPANDED
CONCEPTION OF SECURITY

Despite some significant and persuasive arguments, the expanded view of security has at least four important problems, both substantive and methodological.

1. *Empirical Overstatement*

The critics of the traditional approach to security tend to overstate the changes that have taken place in international politics, and underrate the

FIGURE 1
THE TRADITIONAL/MINIMALIST VERSUS THE POST-COLD
WAR/COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

	Traditional	Post-Cold War
Origin of threats	Rival states (neighbors/great powers)	Nonstate: domestic/transborder; The state versus its citizens
Nature of threats	Military capabilities	Nonmilitary: economic, domestic political; Transnational/global (Immigration, drugs, diseases, environment, proliferation of WMD, crime, terrorism)
The Responses	Military (arms and alliances)	Nonmilitary: free/global markets, democratization, state-building.
The Responsibility for providing security	The state	International institutions; multilateral interventions
Core Values	National independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and sanctity of boundaries	Human rights and needs, economic prosperity, environmental protection

persistence of international anarchy and traditional security concerns. This overstatement concerns the decline in state power and sovereignty, the decline in inter-state rivalries and war and the relevance of military power, and the rise of international institutions.

One source of the critics' misconception is the view which identifies the end of the Cold War with the end of the phenomenon of international war in general.⁵³ Unfortunately this is not the case either logically or empirically. Although the end of the Cold War terminated the East–West division in Europe and brought about a decline in some regional conflicts in the Third World (Southern Africa, Southeast Asia, Central America, and the Arab–Israeli conflict), it did not end all regional disputes (India–Pakistan, China–Taiwan, the two Koreas) and even made possible the eruption of some new violent conflicts in the Balkans, among former Soviet republics, and in some cases in Africa.

More fundamentally, in the absence of effective collective security organizations, there are still threats of armed conflict and organized violence as a last resort in case of sharp disagreements on important values and interests. Indeed, states continue to behave as if physical safety is the core of security.⁵⁴ Thus, even the wealthiest and most secure states – the Western allies – have recently adopted self-help security measures: the US is planning a national missile defense to cover its territory against 'rogue' states. The European Union is drawing up its own autonomous military force. Japan is launching its own reconnaissance satellites instead of depending on American intelligence in response to the North Korean, and potentially future Chinese, missile threats.⁵⁵

The threats that these measures are intended to address (at least in the cases of the US and Japan) stem from traditional inter-state conflicts. Yet, the critics are right in arguing that contemporary security threats include also domestic violence which poses threats to neighboring states and may involve them also in hostilities. As a result, ethnic violence, especially when it involves irredenta or secession, should be regarded as an issue of international security because of its likely transborder effects: creating opportunities for external intervention, generating fears of instability and security dilemmas among neighbors and creating problems of refugees, transborder guerrilla groups and terrorism. It is primarily the threat of ethnic violence (as in the former Yugoslavia) that the EU hopes to address by creating its own army.

Israel's national security also continues to deal with threats of armed conflict and of organized violence against the state and its population, even though the type of threats is changing from the conventional threat posed by

the armies of proximate states (Egypt and Syria) to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by more distant opponents (Iran and Iraq) and to low-intensity conflicts (terrorism and guerrilla warfare) in Israel's more immediate environment. These changes are related to the on-going peace process with Israel's proximate neighbors which is partly related to the change that has taken place in the international environment with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the rise of US hegemony.

Potential long-term changes in the international system (the formation of a countervailing coalition to US hegemony, the rise and strategic involvement in the region of new great powers like China, India, a united Europe, or a resurgent Russia, and US decline or disengagement from the region) may affect the Middle East security environment and result in a renewal of conventional threats to Israel in addition to the non-conventional ones, for example, through a resurgent alliance between Syria and Russia.

In the economic sphere state power may have weakened considerably vis-à-vis nonstate actors. Yet, although states do not possess a complete monopoly over means of violence – organized crime gangs, secessionist ethnic groups, rebels, terrorists, and revolutionaries also possess a considerable amount of weapons and challenge state monopoly – states still remain by far the strongest military actors and control the most powerful means of violence. Thus, states continue to play the central role in international security.

Although the UN has become much more visible in the post-Cold War era than previously, notably in sponsoring peacekeeping operations around the globe, key elements of the anarchic international system have not changed. The UN, whose role is supposedly to take care of threats to international security, does not have independent capacity and resources (that is, its own troops and independent financial revenues) for carrying out peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations, and thus fully depends on states' cooperation. This severely limits its ability to act against the interests of its member states, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, namely, the major powers, who also have the right to veto any Council decision. Thus, even though the Council is authorized to use force against an aggressor state, its ability to do so depends on the good will and cooperation of the powers. That means that there is little chance for effective collective action when the major powers disagree, as is the case more often than not.

Even the 1999 humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was not authorized by the relevant international organization – the UN Security Council. Rather, it was a unilateral decision by NATO which was opposed politically and legally by Russia and China and other Third World states. The

intervention could be carried out for an extended period with low costs to NATO only due to the balance of power between NATO and the other major powers, notably Russia. Russia is both weak militarily (as was manifested in the failure of the military campaign in Chechnya in 1994–96) and is economically highly dependent on the West. Thus it could not deter the Western intervention and eventually had to cooperate in bringing about a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo in June 1999. At the same time, a nuclear-armed Russia is too dangerous for NATO to consider a humanitarian intervention against the Russian human rights violations in Chechnya, which accelerated drastically just a short time after the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo.

Although states continue to be central players in the security field, two types of states should be distinguished according to their degree of coherence, in the sense of identification of the populations with the existing states and their territorial identities. Whereas in coherent states the main security threats are external, incoherent states (which are common in Africa, parts of Asia and the Middle East, and former Soviet republics and in the Balkans) face both external and domestic threats.⁵⁶ The implication is that in the relatively benign post-Cold War international environment under US hegemony, the incoherent states produce a large share of international security problems, which involve primarily these incoherent states and their neighbors.⁵⁷

2. *Loss of Conceptual Clarity*: For a concept to be helpful, it should tell us what it excludes. If one ‘stretches’ a concept to include everything, it loses its analytic utility and explanatory value.⁵⁸ Thus, too much conceptual comprehensiveness results in confusion rather than clarity. The comprehensive notion of security does not make clear what important human domain is *not* security. But if security is everything, then it ceases to be a useful concept. As a result, expanding the ‘security studies’ field would destroy its intellectual coherence.⁵⁹ A good example are the calls to expand or re-define the concept of national security to include environmental degradation.⁶⁰ As Deudney argues:

national-security-from-violence and environmental habitability have little in common. Given these differences, the rising fashion of linking them risks creating a conceptual muddle rather than a paradigm or world view shift – a de-definition rather than a re-definition of security. If we begin to speak about all the forces and events that threaten life, property and well-being (on a large scale) as threats to our national security, we shall soon drain the term of any meaning. All large-scale evils will become threats to national security...⁶¹

3. *Inability to Evaluate Trade-Offs*: A related implication of concept 'stretching' is that the concept then becomes useless for making distinctions that are necessary both for theory building and prioritizing for policy purposes. If everything is security, how can we appreciate such tradeoffs as guns versus butter? Security should be seen as one important value among many. In a world in which there is a scarcity of resources, there is a need to allocate them among competing objectives, and thus one cannot avoid the question how much security is enough.⁶² The pursuit of security always comes at the expense of other values that could have been pursued with the resources allocated to security. Thus, a specification of the concept of security makes possible an informed debate on how much to allocate to this domain relative to competing objectives.⁶³

4. *Confusion between Empirical Analysis and Normative Advocacy*: There is a difference between arguing on an empirical basis that elites in the Third World care largely about regime security and that they often threaten the well-being of their citizens,⁶⁴ and the liberal-idealist advocacy of putting individual human rights at the center of the international security concept on normative grounds. Rather than simply asserting the importance of humanitarian interventions, analysts still have to investigate whether and under what conditions such interventions are becoming a major pattern and norm of behavior by major states and multilateral coalitions in the post-Cold War era.⁶⁵

The linkage of security and environmental issues is also made for polemical-political purposes⁶⁶ in order to show that these new issues are as important as traditional security ones and thus deserve as much money, manpower and prestige. Yet, that legitimate desire does not make the environment issue a security issue on substantive grounds and on the merit of the case. Moreover, a manipulation of the concept of security for polemical-political purposes, for example through the so called 'securitization' of potentially any conceivable issue⁶⁷ can be dangerous because politicians can abuse it for their narrow goals as they have done numerous times in the past. A coherent and consistent conception of security can make it possible to challenge such abuses and to show that political manipulations do not enhance national security.

Defining the Security Domain: The Need to Distinguish Between the Phenomenon to be Explained and its Competing Explanations

Based on the above critique of the expanders, my response to the debate between the expanders and the minimalists is a distinction between the subject matter of the security field and its explanations. In order to make

clear what is included – and what should be excluded – from the security field, we need to differentiate between the phenomenon to be explained (i.e., the dependent variable) and its competing explanations (i.e., the independent variables). The dependent variable defines the scope of the field and its subject area, namely, organized inter-group violence. Yet, contrary to the traditionalist/realist conception, the field should also include efforts to eliminate threats of such violence by peacemaking.

Thus, the dependent variable of security studies deals with the outbreak, threat, management and prevention of organized violence among groups (notably, but not exclusively, states), that is, issues of war and peace.⁶⁸ More specifically, security issues include threats of resort to force, the eruption of wars, the management of wars and the means of violence, conflict prevention, and peacemaking.

The independent variables refer to any cause or source which affects the likelihood of wars and organized violence. They concern the explanations, causes and sources of variations in the onset of wars, the management of the use of force or the decline in the likelihood of violence, that is, the emergence of peace. These sources can be realist or military, such as questions of power (power maximization as a policy objective,⁶⁹ or the distribution of capabilities or polarity as a causal variable)⁷⁰ and security, (notably the security dilemma and the offense/defense balance).⁷¹

But the independent variables can also be nonmilitary: nationalism,⁷² nation-to-state imbalance,⁷³ ethnic conflict, territory, culture (such as a clash of civilizations), ideology, domestic regimes (that may produce diversionary wars) and elite security.

Environmental factors should be included to the extent that they affect the likelihood of violence (like water or energy shortages or other environmental scarcities)⁷⁴ but not if they are ecological developments that threaten all of humanity but do not affect (for better or worse) the question of war and peace.

Similarly, a humanitarian distribution of food to hungry people in Africa is not a security issue unless it becomes entangled with organized violence and an armed conflict. Thus, even if the initial intention of President George Bush in late 1992 was a purely humanitarian intervention in Somalia, it became a major security issue once US troops began to get involved in continuous hostilities with Somali gangs.

Sources of peace should also be included in the security field: both realist causes (deterrence, balance of power, hegemony, alliances) and liberal explanations (the democratic peace theory, economic interdependence, international institutions), and also the effects on peace of the following

factors and policies: state-building,⁷⁵ the growth of civil society, the promotion of human rights and humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peacemaking.

Thus, since peace is a core component of security, the Arab-Israeli peace process should be evaluated as a road to national and regional security and not only as a moral issue or a question of economic prosperity and social welfare. The connection between peace and security should be manifested in the reduction of threats of organized violence against Israel as the peace process progresses. For example, while the return of the Golan Heights to Syria may weaken Israel's security by reducing its defensive capabilities and by making a potential Syrian attack easier, the withdrawal from the Golan may also enhance security to the extent that it reduces the Syrian threat to Israel due to the combined effect of the mitigation of the Syrian motive to attack Israel and the stabilizing role of the proposed security arrangements between Israel and Syria. Thus, the relations between the peace process and Israeli security have to be carefully investigated for both theoretical and policy purposes.

DEVELOPING THE SECURITY CONCEPT

The distinction between independent and dependent variables allows to develop the security concept further. As noted above, a state is secure under the following two conditions:

1. If threats of violence against the core values of the state are present, the state can be secure to the extent that it possesses the capabilities to defend its key values at reasonable costs.
2. In the absence of threats of violence against the state's major values.

The focus on one of these two conditions allows to distinguish between two major schools of thought in International Relations and their competing approaches to security issues: realists on the one hand, and liberals on the other.⁷⁶

In contrast to liberals, realists are skeptical that it can ever be possible for states not to face threats for an extended period so long as the international system is anarchic, that is, while states have to provide for their own security. Thus, for realists, since some level of external threats of violence is given over time, the key to state security lies in possessing the capabilities essential to cope with such threats. Realists argue that it is difficult to plan one's security according to the estimation of the intentions of other states, both

because it is very difficult to know others' intentions and because intentions can change easily. Therefore, the assessment of intentions should be based on a cautious worst-case analysis. In contrast, there can be a greater confidence in identifying capabilities, and it is also less easy to change capabilities overnight. Indeed, for realists the key to security is the balance of capabilities and this balance shapes intentions: an imbalance of power creates a temptation for aggression; thus, a powerful state which faces weak opponents will abuse and coerce them. At the same time, equal or superior capabilities induce moderation in a rival because of the expected high costs of aggression. In other words, capabilities produce intentions.

Realists differ in whether equal or superior capabilities (relative to rivals) are more desirable in providing security. While offensive realists⁷⁷ argue that superior capabilities that are able to overwhelm the rival are generally a better guarantee of security, defensive realists⁷⁸ advance a more nuanced conception based on the security dilemma. According to this view, superior capabilities are perceived by rivals as threatening and encourage them to develop their capabilities further, thus becoming a source of insecurity. As a result, defensive realists recommend a more equal balance of capabilities that is sufficient for deterring rivals.

An Israeli security issue that may illustrate the different approaches of defensive and offensive realists is the question of Israel's alliance with Turkey. Thus, offensive realists advocate the enhancement of Israel's alliance with Turkey, and in the future potentially also with Iran, in order to maximize Israel's capabilities vis-à-vis its proximate Arab opponents (primarily Syria). Offensive realists are skeptical regarding the possibility for a lasting peace among neighbors with a long history of violent disputes. Thus, their policy recommendation is to ally with the neighbors of the neighbors since the 'enemy of my enemy is my friend', and the neighbors themselves are usually enemies.

Defensive realists, on the other hand, regard the alliance with Turkey as dangerous and destabilizing because it increases the Arabs' security dilemma due to their fear of the Israeli-Turkish axis which might be directed against them in future. Thus, defensive realists recommend lowering the profile of this bilateral relationship, especially in the strategic field, in order not to frighten the Arabs and not to compel them to respond by countervailing moves such as armament and the formation of a balancing coalition. The result of such moves could be the escalation of Middle East tensions and a growing danger of regional war.

An important component of security according to the logic of defensive realism are security arrangements and confidence-building measures which

enhance transparency and reduce the ability to conduct a surprise attack, and thus mitigate mutual fears about being attacked. These fears are a major source of insecurity, especially if offensive capabilities have an advantage over defensive ones (and consequently there are advantages to preempting the opponent by attacking first), or if it is impossible to distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities.⁷⁹ The purpose of arms control, in this view, is to decrease the offensive capabilities of states while enhancing defensive ones in nonprovocative ways, and thus to reduce the security dilemma and provide mutual reassurance by making as sharp a distinction as possible between offensive and defensive capabilities.

Thus, according to this perspective, such security arrangements as demilitarized zones, areas of force reduction and early warning stations in the Golan Heights will enhance Israel's security vis-à-vis Syria. This is because they will minimize the gravest security danger to Israel – that of a strategic surprise by an attacking Arab army or a coalition of such armies, and as a result Israel's security fears and its consequent aggressive behavior will decline as well. Moreover, the current proximity of the Israeli forces in the Golan Heights to the Syrian capital aggravates the Syrian security dilemma as well, and thus creates a permanent danger of an inadvertent escalation, even if currently the Syrian army is relatively weak. Thus, removing the Israeli forces away from Damascus while at the same time removing the Syrian army from the Israeli border and creating a large buffer between them will reduce drastically the danger of an uncontrolled escalation.

Defensive realists view the nuclear revolution as the ultimate guarantor of security that provided states with the ability to deter each other by having a capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on their opponents. Yet, mutual security is enhanced only in a situation of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) in which all parties have a secure second-strike capability, that is, can absorb a massive surprise attack and still inflict unacceptable damage on the opponent, and thus none of the parties has incentives to preempt and to strike first.⁸⁰

Thus, the security implications of Israel's monopoly over nuclear weapons in the Middle East are complex. On the one hand, they compensate for Israel's basic inferiority in manpower and strategic depth and therefore provide the most effective deterrence against a potential attack by a grand Arab coalition and against the use of non-conventional weapons by Israel's opponents. Israel's nuclear deterrence might even have encouraged the Arabs to desert the war option by making victory infeasible and to join the peace process. At the same time, in the view of defensive realists the Israeli

nuclear option might increase Arab insecurity and thus the security dilemma in the region, provide incentives for Arab states and Iran to acquire their own weapons of mass destruction, and result in an arms race and potentially less stable multipolar deterrence than was the case in the bipolar superpower relations.⁸¹

A related conceptual and policy question concerns the potential trade-offs between deterrence and defense: will the deployment of a defensive anti-missile system like the Arrow reinforce Israel's security or jeopardize it? Defensive realists, who tend to be deterrence purists, argue that a defensive build-up, which makes the state less vulnerable to attack and therefore more capable of preemption, increases the opponents' security dilemma, thus leading to an arms race and growing mutual insecurity. Thus, Israel should avoid the Arrow and related defensive systems. In contrast, defense advocates assert that deterrence can fail and then the absence of defense can lead to a catastrophe. Accordingly, they recommend the deployment of missile defense. The logic of offensive realism suggests that the combined effect of Israel's deterrence, anti-missile defense and strong conventional capabilities will ensure Israel's military superiority, which, in their eyes, is the best guarantee of its national security.

In contrast to realists, who take the existence of some level of security threats for granted and therefore concentrate on the capabilities to meet them, liberals focus on state intentions as the major factor affecting international security. Liberals strongly believe in the independent effects of intentions, namely, that given benign intentions, states will not develop offensive capabilities, and thus according to this view intentions generate capabilities.⁸²

According to the most prevalent liberal theory of peace – the democratic/liberal peace theory – liberal democracies do not fight each other.⁸³ As a result, liberals believe in the feasibility of enhancing peace and security through democratization. This theory has inspired the Clinton administration's policy of 'enlargement', designed to enlarge the world's 'community of market democracies'.⁸⁴ President Clinton asserted that this strategy serves US interests because 'democracies rarely wage war on one another'.⁸⁵

Other major liberal peacemaking mechanisms include creating economic interdependence among states so that they will prefer 'to trade than to invade'. In the liberal view, trading states are not interested in building invading armies.⁸⁶ Liberals also believe that enhancing the power of international institutions or regimes will increase the incentives of states to cooperate with each other and will thus produce more benign state intentions.⁸⁷

In the area of security, the most relevant institution is a collective security system under which all peace-loving states are committed to come automatically to the defense of any state attacked by an aggressor irrespective of previous particularistic ties, affiliations and alliances with the victim state. It is a system based on the universal norm of 'one for all and all for one'.⁸⁸

Despite their general focus on state intentions, liberals agree that capabilities are a key to security to the extent that their various prescriptions for violence-avoidance are not carried out, that is, among states at least some of whom are non-democracies, are not economically interdependent or are not members of international institutions. Thus, democracies facing illiberal states, who are likely to produce offensive capabilities, will have to respond by building comparable capabilities.

The competing approaches of realism and liberalism to the security field may clarify a major policy issue facing Israel, namely the question of separation versus integration with the Palestinians, especially in the economic domain, following the expected establishment of a Palestinian state as a part of the final-status peace agreement.

Liberals prescribe economic integration in order to increase mutual prosperity and thus mutual satisfaction and lower the incentives for a resort to violence. Economic interdependence in the liberal view is a recipe for avoiding violence also because the costs of the use of force rise while its benefits decline. Economic interdependence is thus helpful for creating common interests and for enhancing cooperation in other fields including the diplomatic and security ones.

In contrast, realists see integration and the resultant growing contact and entanglement among neighbors as providing many areas of disagreement among them, and therefore as a recipe for continuing conflict with an ever-present danger of escalation to violence. Integration which involves open borders might also enhance the capabilities to inflict damage (for example, by terrorist incursions). Thus, while liberals prescribe Israeli-Palestinian economic integration, realists recommend a separation between the two ex-enemies based on the idea that 'high fences make good neighbors' – the lesser the contact, the lower the potential for violent conflict.

Figure 2 presents a typology of four ideal type situations of different levels of national security based on the combination of the two factors discussed above – the presence of threats to the state and its capabilities of defending against them. The presence of threats is itself a function of the capabilities and aggressive intentions of rival states.⁸⁹

FIGURE 2
LEVELS OF SECURITY ACCORDING TO THE PRESENCE OF THREATS AND THE
CAPACITY TO DEFEND AGAINST THEM

		Presence of External Security Threats	
		High	Low
Capacity to Defend Against Threats	High	<p>1</p> <p>Balance of Power</p> <p>Deterrence (Cold war or cold peace)</p>	<p>4</p> <p>Hegemony</p> <p>Emergence of non-traditional security agenda</p>
	Low	<p>2</p> <p>Small states faced by major rivals: insecurity and vulnerability</p>	<p>3</p> <p>'Warm peace' among democracies</p> <p>Isolated small states</p>

In situation no. 1 the state faces external security threats, derived from the hostile intentions and offensive capabilities of rival states, but it is able to defend against them at affordable costs. The outcome is a balance of power and deterrence, often manifested in an arms race and the formation of countervailing coalitions. Even if a hot war does not erupt, the outcome is a cold war.⁹⁰ This is a situation of 'negative peace'⁹¹ – a mere absence of hot war in which hostilities may break out in the near future. It is characterized by recurrent military crises and a considerable likelihood of escalation to war in either a premeditated or an inadvertent manner.⁹² The parties succeed at best in managing the crises, that is, in avoiding an escalation to war while protecting their vital interests,⁹³ but they do not attempt seriously to resolve the fundamental issues in dispute between them. Such a conception of a cold war fits nicely with Hobbes' idea of the 'state of war' as not necessarily consisting of 'actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.'⁹⁴ An example is the acute periods of the Cold War in superpower relations.

To the extent that the balance of power or deterrence situation stabilizes and the parties also manage to reduce some of the sources of tension and

conflict among them, their relations may progress to cold peace, in which the threat of war is substantially mitigated, although it does not disappear for the long run. An example is *détente* periods in US-Soviet relations during the Cold War.

In world no. 2 the state is in the worst possible situation: it faces external security threats, caused by the offensive intentions and capabilities of adversaries, but is unable to defend against them because it has neither the resources nor the external allies for mounting an effective defense at affordable costs. That makes the state very vulnerable and insecure and as a result likely to submit to external pressures and even lose its independence. The Munich agreement of 1938 is the classical example after Czechoslovakia was deserted by its Western allies and thus became vulnerable to Nazi Germany.⁹⁵ Such is the context for the establishment of great power spheres of influence like the Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe after 1945 and the American one in the Caribbean Basin during the entire twentieth century.⁹⁶

In the third situation the state faces no external threats despite its weakness relative to potential rivals. This situation may describe a warm and stable peace among the members of a 'pluralistic security community'.⁹⁷ Warm peace is a situation in which war is virtually unthinkable. Even if some issues are in dispute among the states, the use of force is completely out of the question and is ruled out as an option for addressing them. This high level of peace is characterized by extensive transnational relations and a high degree of regional interdependence. This type of relations is most likely in a region populated by liberal democracies,⁹⁸ as in the North Atlantic region after 1945. The security community that has emerged in this region allows even small states such as the Scandinavian and Benelux states to feel secure despite their weakness relative to major powers such as the US or Germany. The combination of low capabilities and low threats may also characterize small states who are sufficiently removed from potential strong opponents so as not to be threatened – for example, the small island nations of Oceania.

World 4 is a hegemonic world. The hegemon does not face any serious great power rival and thus it does not have to cope with major strategic threats to its core values. At the same time, the hegemon possesses a large repertoire of military means at its disposal. As a result, threats which are considered minor during an era of great power rivalry move to the top of the security agenda in a hegemonic period. This upgrading includes issues such as transnational organized crime, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, since a great variety of military means is available to the hegemon and it has no use against the targets for which it

was designed originally, there is a growing pressure to employ them against the new non-traditional threats. This situation has emerged with the end of Cold War, the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the great military superiority of the US. To a large extent, this is the background for the much greater prominence of the demands to expand the security concept.⁹⁹

Israel is situated in world 1 (high threats/high defensive capabilities). Since its independence in 1948 it faced a situation of cold war with all its neighbors, punctuated by hot wars. Since the last major Arab–Israeli war in 1973 the relations have stabilized and evolved toward cold peace. Major landmarks in this process have been the formal conclusion of peace with Egypt (in the Camp David accords of 1978) and with Jordan (in 1994) as well as the Oslo interim agreements with the Palestinians (1993–95). Yet, neither of these relations has so far progressed beyond cold peace. Moreover, the achievement of cold peace and its endurance depend heavily on the US role as the honest broker and the referee, and also the provider of financial aid and security guarantees in the regional peace process.¹⁰⁰

Stabilizing the regional Arab–Israeli peace depends first of all on resolving all the outstanding issues which are still in dispute: boundaries, security arrangements, Palestinian statehood, Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlements and the status of Jerusalem. ‘Warming’ the regional Arab–Israeli peace in the longer run so that neither Israel nor its opponents will feel threatened depends on major domestic changes within the regional states, especially a growing identification of the key national groups in the region with the states in which they reside and the related decline of revisionist/irredentist and secessionist claims, followed by liberalization and democratization in the Arab world and Iran.¹⁰¹ However, since these processes may take some time while democratization can be de-stabilizing, at least for the short term,¹⁰² the hegemonic role of the US as a stabilizing force will be essential during the period of transition to democracy. Only if this domestic transformation is successfully completed, will a liberal-democratic Middle East be able to pursue economic integration, the building of regional institutions and the promotion of human and minority rights, producing a full-blown warm peace.

CONCLUSIONS

This contribution contrasted two major competing approaches to the concept of security following the end of the Cold War. The traditional/realist school argues that since the anarchic nature of international politics did not fundamentally change with the end of the Cold War, there is no need for a

significant redefinition or expansion of the security concept. In contrast, those who call for the expansion of the concept assert that the world has changed dramatically in the recent decade and thus it is imperative to redefine the security concept to reflect both empirical and normative changes.

I suggest that both approaches face major problems. The realists overlook the nonmilitary factors affecting security and especially the connection between peace and security. The expanders, for their part, ignore the remaining importance of armed conflict under international anarchy, and also undermine the coherence of the concept of security by stretching it almost endlessly.

My argument is that the security field should continue to deal with questions of violence and armed conflicts at different levels of intensity, but with a growing focus on both nonmilitary causes of war and on the factors and conditions which affect peacemaking as a major security strategy.

The Israeli case, discussed at length in the other essays in this collection, is a major example of a state which still faces a great number of threats of violence, ranging from low-intensity conflict through conventional interstate war to nonconventional weapons, and thus it has to provide for its own national defense against these threats. At the same time, Israel is engaged in a potentially very promising, although risky, regional peace process which can considerably enhance its national security as well as the security of its neighbors and of the region as a whole.

NOTES

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1. These citations are in Emma Rothschild, 'What is Security?', *Daedalus* 124/3 (Summer 1995) pp.53–98 at pp.55–6.
2. Richard Ullman, 'Redefining Security', *International Security* 8/1 (Summer 1983).
3. Cited in Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era* (Chapel Hill: UNC 1991) p.17; and in Marc Levy, 'Is the Environment a National Security Issue?', *International Security* 20/2 (Fall 1995) pp.35–62 at p.40. See also the citations of new definitions of the concept security in Daniel Deudney, 'The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security', *Millennium* 19/3 (Winter 1990) pp.461–76 at p.462; and the review in Levy (note 3) and the long list of references in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (NY: Columbia UP 1996) p.9, n.20.
4. Levy (note 3) p.61; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods', *Mershon International Studies Review* 40/2 (Oct. 1996) pp.229–54 at p.233.
5. See Stephen Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly* 35/2 (1991) pp.211–40 at p.212. See also Deudney (note 3); and Levy (note 3). For a

critique of Walt, see Edward A. Kolodziej, 'Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat lector!' *International Studies Quarterly* 36/4 (Dec. 1992).

6. Helga Haftendorn, 'The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline Building in International Security', *International Studies Quarterly* 35/1 (1991) pp.3–17 cited in Levy (note 3) p.39. See also the useful discussion by Patrick M. Morgan 'Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders', in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.) *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP 1997) pp.22–4.
7. This refers to normally functioning states. In the case of 'weak', and especially 'failed' or collapsed states, the state is unable to maintain a monopoly over means of violence and provide security to its citizens. The result is instability and insecurity similar, in principle, to the anarchic international system. In practice, the level of violence in these failed states might far exceed the situation in a particular international system, especially if various stabilizing mechanisms operate effectively in that system, as discussed below. On weak and collapsed or failed states, see Buzan (note 3) pp.99–103; Mohammed Ayooob, *The Third World Security Predicament* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1995); William Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1995); K.J. Holsti, *War, The State, and the State of War* (Cambridge: CUP 1996); and Barry Buzan and Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998).
8. On international anarchy, see Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', *World Politics* 30/2 (Jan. 1978) pp.167–214; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979); Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (NY: Columbia UP 1977); and Buzan (note 3) p.21.
For critiques of the realist conception of anarchy, see Helen Milner, 'The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: a critique', *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991) pp.67–85; and Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it', *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992). See also Robert Powell, 'Anarchy in international relations theory: the neorealist-neoliberal debate', *ibid.* 48/2 (Spring 1994) pp.313–44; James Fearon, 'Rationalist explanations for war', *ibid.* 49/3 (Summer 1995) pp.379–414; and Jonathan Mercer, 'Anarchy and identity', *ibid.* 49/2 (Spring 1995) pp.229–52.
9. Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (NY: Columbia UP 1959).
10. Waltz (note 8) pp.112–13.
11. On the security dilemma, see John H. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics* 2/2 (Jan. 1950) pp.157–80; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton UP 1976); Jervis (note 8); Robert Jervis, 'Security Regimes', in Stephen Krasner (ed.) *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1983); *idem.*, 'From Balance of Power to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation', *World Politics* 38/1 (Oct. 1985) pp.58–79; Alexander George, 'Factors Influencing Security Cooperation', in *idem.*, Philip Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds.) *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (NY: OUP 1988) Ch.27, pp.656–8; and Benjamin Miller, 'Polarity, Nuclear Weapons, and Major War', *Security Studies* 4/3 (Summer 1994).
12. Waltz (note 9) p.234; Jervis (note 11, 1976) pp.67, 94; Jervis (note 8); Robert Jervis, 'Systems Theories and Diplomatic History', in Lauren G. Paul (ed.) *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (NY: Free Press 1979) pp.213, 217; Jervis (note 11, 1985); Alexander George, 'Ideology and International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis', Draft of a paper prepared for a conference on *Ideology and its Influence on International Politics* (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem 1984) pp.4–5; Benjamin Miller, *When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics* (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press 1995) Ch.3; and Charles Glaser, 'The Security Dilemma Revisited', *World Politics* 50/1 (Oct. 1997).
13. See Ayooob (note 7) pp.4–12.
14. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1962) p.150. See also the refinement in David A. Baldwin 'The Concept of Security', *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997) pp.5–26 at p.13: 'a low probability of damage to acquired values'.

15. See Lippmann's definition, cited in Ayoob (note 7) p.5.
16. These five components constitute an ideal type and there are differences on some of these points among different traditionalist scholars.
17. A considerable amount of research shows that most wars take place between neighboring states. For a review of these findings, see John A. Vasquez, 'Why do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction or Territoriality', *Journal of Peace Research* 32/3 (1995) pp.277–93 at pp.278–9.
18. The balance of power school (overviewed in Benjamin Miller, 'Competing Realist Approaches to Great Power Crisis Behavior', *Security Studies* 5/2, Spring 1996) underlines the prevalence under anarchy of states preserving their security by balancing either the power of the strong states in the international system (Waltz, note 8) or particularly the power of threatening states (Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1987)). The balancing is done either internally (armament) or externally (alliances).
19. The best critique is Wolfers' classic essay: Arnold Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol', in Wolfers (note 14) pp.147–65.
20. Wolfers (note 19) p.159.
21. *Ibid.* p.161.
22. On the Munich analogy, see Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War* (Princeton UP 1992) Ch.7.
23. The classic discussion is Jervis (note 11, 1976) Ch.3. For an overview, see Martin Patchen, *Resolving Disputes between Nations: Coercion or Conciliation?* (Durham, NC: Duke UP 1988). The dilemma is implied as a major point of contention in the current debate between defensive and offensive realists. For overviews of the debate, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, 'Preface', in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.) *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1995); Benjamin Frankel, 'Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction', *Security Studies* 5/3 (Spring 1996); Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 'Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay', *International Security* 23 (Fall 1998) pp.157–82; and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'Security-Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered', Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the *International Studies Association* (Washington DC, Feb. 1999).
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26. Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?' *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989) pp.3–18.
27. Krause and Williams (note 4).
28. Ayoob (note 7); J. Ann Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theory Today* (Oxford: OUP 1995) pp.175–97 at p.179.
29. James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: CUP 1990); Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (note 7) p.53.
30. Ayoob (note 7); K.J. Holsti, 'International Theory and War in the Third World', in Brian Job (ed.) *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1992) pp.37–62 at pp.37–8; Holsti (note 7); Morgan (note 6) p.23 and the citations he cites.
31. Nicole Ball, *Security and Economy in the Third World* (Princeton UP 1988); Buzan (note 3) pp.43–50.
32. See Rothschild (note 1).
33. Ullman (note 2); see also Tickner (note 28) p.182.
34. See Buzan (note 3); for further development of this conception of security, see Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (note 7).
35. E. Azar and C. Moon (eds.) *National Security in the Third World* (London: Edward Elgar 1988); Myron Weiner, 'Security, Stability, and International Migration', *International Security* 17/3 (Winter 1992–93); Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (NY: Simon & Schuster 1996).
36. Buzan (note 3).
37. Ball (note 31).
38. C. Thomas, *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations* (Boulder, CO:

- Lynne Rienner 1987); Seyom Brown, 'World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security', in Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandrani, *World Security: Challenges for New Security* (NY: St Martin's Press 1998); additional citations in Tickner (note 28) pp.180–2.
39. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (note 7) pp.71–94.
 40. Jessica Mathews, 'Redefining Security', *Foreign Affairs* 68/2 (Spring 1989) pp.162–77. For additional citations see Duedney (note 3) p.462 and Levy (note 3).
 41. Ball (note 31).
 42. Kant cited in Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', *American Political Science Review* 80 (Dec. 1986) pp.1151–69; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 'Structural and Normative causes of Peace between Democracies', *American Political Science Review* 87/3 (Sept. 1993) pp.624–38.
 43. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder 'Democratization and War', *Foreign Affairs* 74/3 (May/June 1995) pp.79–97.
 44. Ayoob (note 7); Holsti (note 7).
 45. Rosecrance (note 24); Carl Kaysen, 'Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay', *International Security* 14/4 (Spring 1990); reprinted in Sean M. Lynn-Jones (ed.) *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1990) pp.81–103.
 46. See Buzan (note 3) p.13, n.35.
 47. Tickner (note 28) pp.181–2.
 48. On cooperative security and multilateralism, see Janne E. Nolan (ed.) *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington DC: Brookings 1994); John G. Ruggie (ed.) *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (NY: Columbia UP 1993); and the citations in Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross 'Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy', *International Security* 21/3 (Winter 1996–97) pp.5–53 at pp.23–32.
 49. For the institutionalist perspective in International Relations, see R. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton UP 1984); R. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1989).
 50. On state sovereignty and international intervention, see Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds.) *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1995).
 51. Patrick M. Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders', in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.) *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP 1997) pp.20–44 at p.24.
 52. Posen and Ross (note 48) pp.25–9.
 53. Fukuyama (note 26); Mueller (note 25); Samuel Huntington, 'No Exit: The Errors of Endism', *The National Interest* 17 (Fall 1989).
 54. Morgan (note 51) pp.22–3.
 55. See Jim Hoagland, 'In New Millennium, the World is Confronted by a Tableau of Contradictions', *International Herald Tribune* (3 Jan. 2000) pp.1, 5.
 56. Buzan (note 3); Ayoob (note 7); Stephen Van Evera, 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and War', *International Security* 18 (Spring 1994) pp.5–39; Holsti (note 7).
 57. See Benjamin Miller, 'Explaining Regional War-Propensity: The Middle East in a Comparative Perspective', Paper presented at the meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington DC (1999a); idem, 'Between War and Peace: Systemic Effects on the Transition of the Middle East and the Balkans from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War Era', Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta (1999b); idem, 'The Sources of Regional War and Peace: Integrating the Effects of Nationalism, Liberalism and the International System', Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta (1999c); idem, 'Hot War, Cold Peace: International-Regional Synthesis', in Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (eds.) *War in a Changing World* (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press, forthcoming).
 58. On concept 'stretching', see Giovanni Sartori, 'Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics', *American Political Science Review* 64 (Dec. 1970) pp.1033–53.
 59. Walt (note 5) pp.212–3; Katzenstein (note 3) p.11.

60. Brown and Matthews cited in Deudney (note 3) p.462, n.2.
61. Deudney (note 3) p.465.
62. Baldwin (note 14) p.15; Morgan (note 51) p.22.
63. Baldwin (note 14) pp.16–7, 21–2.
64. Ayooob (note 7); Holsti (note 7).
65. See Benjamin Miller, 'The Logic of US Military Interventions in the post-Cold War Era', *Contemporary Security Policy* 19/3 (Dec. 1998) pp.72–109.
66. Deudney (note 3) p.465; Levy (note 3) p.44.
67. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (note 7).
68. The proposed definition of inter-group violence excludes personal or gang violence and occasional strikes or riots from the security domain, but includes armed inter-state and low-intensity conflict 'ranging from guerrilla and partisan war, insurgency and counter-insurgency, unconventional war and protracted conflict'. Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (eds.) *Low-Intensity Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Westview 1992) p.7.
69. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* 5th ed. (NY: Knopf 1978); Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton UP 1998).
70. Waltz (note 8).
71. Jervis (note 8); Glaser (note 12).
72. Stephen Van Evera, 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and War', *International Security* 18 (Spring 1994) pp.5–39.
73. Benjamin Miller, 'The Sources of Regional War and Peace: Integrating the Effects of Nationalism, Liberalism and the International System', Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta (1999c).
74. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases', *International Security* 19/1 (Summer 1994); Peter H. Gleick, 'Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security', *International Security* 18 (1993) pp.79–112; and Miriam R. Lowi, 'Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes and the Case of West Bank Water', *International Security* 18 (1993) pp.113–38.
75. Ayooob (note 7); Holsti (note 7).
76. On various aspects of the realist-liberal debate, see Joseph Nye, 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism', *World Politics* 40/2 (Jan. 1988) pp.235–51; David A. Baldwin (ed.) *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (NY: Columbia UP 1993); Charles W. Kegley Jr (ed.) *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge* (NY: St Martin's Press 1995); and Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (NY: Norton 1997).
77. See John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security* 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5–56; John Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', in Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.) *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1995); Zakaria (note 69).
78. Jervis (note 8); Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984); Walt (note 18); Charles Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help', *International Security* 19/3 (Winter 1994–95); Glaser (note 12); Stephen Van Evera, *The Causes of War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1999).
79. On the offense-defense balance as a key factor in affecting the likelihood of war in defensive realism, see Jervis (note 8); Glaser (note 12); Stephen Van Evera, 'Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War', *International Security* 22/4 (Spring 1998); Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-defense theory and its critics', *Security Studies* 4/3 (Summer 1995); Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What is the Offense-Defense Balance and How can We Measure It?' *International Security* 22/4 (Spring 1998).
80. Jervis (note 8); Kenneth Waltz, 'Nuclear Myths and Political Realities', *American Political Science Review* 84/3 (Sept. 1990) pp.731–46; Glaser (note 78).
81. On the distinctive effects of polarity and nuclear weapons on the occurrence of war, see Miller (note 11).
82. At the same time, classical and neoclassical realists (unlike neorealists) also accept the independent role of intentions through a key distinction between revisionist and status quo

- states. See Morgenthau (note 69); Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (NY: The Universal Library 1964); Randall Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (NY: Columbia UP 1997).
83. Doyle (note 42); Maoz and Russett (note 42). For critiques, see Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (eds.) *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1996).
 84. Lake cited in Joanne Gowa, 'Democratic States and International Disputes', *International Organization* 49/3 (Summer 1995) pp.511–22, at p.511, n.1.
 85. Clinton cited in Gowa (note 84) p.511, n.2.
 86. Rosecrance (note 24); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977). For a critique, see Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean Marc F. Blanchard 'Commercial liberalism under fire: evidence from 1914 and 1936', *Security Studies* 6/2 (Winter 1996–97) pp.5–50.
 87. Keohane (note 49); Stephen Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1983). For critiques, see John Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Johns and Steven E. Miller (eds.) *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1995), and Korina Kagan, 'The Myth of the European Concert: The Realist-Institutionalist Debate and Great Power Behavior in the Eastern Question, 1821–41', *Security Studies* (Winter 1997–98) pp.1–57.
 88. Inis Claude, *Power and International Relations* (NY: Random House 1962); Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', *International Security* 16/1 (Summer 1991) pp.114–61. For a critique, see Richard Betts, 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe', *International Security* 17/1 (Summer 1992) pp.5–43.
 89. On the balance of threats, see Walt (note 18).
 90. The typology of hot war, cold war, cold peace and warm peace is based on Miller, 'The Sources of Regional War and Peace' (note 57, 1999c).
 91. On this concept, see Arie M. Kacowicz, 'Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?' *Journal of Peace Research* 32/3 (Aug. 1995) pp.265–76 at p.268.
 92. On inadvertent wars, see Alexander George, *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1991); and Miller (note 11).
 93. On crisis management, see Alexander George, David Hall and William Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971) pp.8–11 and others cited in Miller (note 12) p.93, n.34.
 94. Cited in Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press 1989) p.2.
 95. David Vital, *The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict* (London: Oxford UP 1971).
 96. Korina Kagan, 'Authoritarian and Democratic Great Powers and their Proximate Spheres of Influence', PhD Dissertation (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem 2000).
 97. Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton UP 1957); Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Pluralistic security communities* (Cambridge: CUP 1998).
 98. Benjamin Miller, 'When regions become peaceful: Explaining transitions from war to peace', Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles (March 2000).
 99. While there are other on-going processes conducive to the re-examination of the security concept, such as democratization and a growing concern about human rights, the technological/information revolution and the globalization of markets, all these processes are facilitated by US hegemony, thus highlighting how crucial this variable is with regard to the concept of security.
 100. See Miller (note 57, 1999b).
 101. On the strategies and conditions for achieving warm regional peace, see Miller (note 57, 1999c), Miller (note 98).
 102. Mansfield and Snyder (note 43).